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FOREIGN NATION SUITS FOR TREBLE 
DAMAGES UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT AFTER 
PFIZER v. GOVERNMENT OF IND/A 
Despite the long-standing right of foreign nations to sue in 
American courts, 1 the issue of a foreign government's ability t.o 
1 "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . affecting Ambassadors, other pub-
lic Ministers and Consuls; ... to Controversies ... between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 1. 
The basis for this right is the principle of international comity. Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). "What is termed the 'comity of nations' is the formal 
expression and ultimate result of that mutual respect accorded throughout the civilized 
world by the representatives of each sovereign power to those of every other .... " 
Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 34 A. 714, 716 (Conn. 1895). See also Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 139 N.E. 259 (N.Y. 1923). Comity is not, however, 
a matter of mere courtesy or goodwill. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398 (1964). The purpose of comity is to promote friendly relations between sovereigns so 
that justice between individuals can be achieved. "We do justice that justice may be 
done in return." Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 139 N.E. 259, 
260 (N.Y. 1923). 
The Supreme Court has rejected several alternative rationales as a basis for maintain-
ing a suit, namely, diplomatic or "friendly" relations with the United States and reci-
procity of treatment for American nationals suing in foreign courts. Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
This right, however, is subject to some exceptions. Federal courts will not entertain an 
action to enforce the penal codes of another state. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 
265 (1888) (the penal laws of a country do not reach beyond its boundaries except when 
extended by express treaty or statute; such laws cannot be administered by the courts of 
another nation). The Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §7 (1976), forbids 
suits by nations at war with the United States. A government not recognized by the 
executive branch cannot maintain an action in American courts. Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938). At times courts have extended this prohibition to 
suits brought by entities considered to be extensions of the unrecognized sovereign. Com-
pare Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (New York 
corporation wholly-owned by unrecognized Soviet government granted standing to chal-
lenge import duty because of its New York citizenship and the absence of a public policy 
issue) with Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), 
aff'd per curiam, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973) (East German art museum denied standing 
to intervene in private action because it was mere instrumentality of an unrecognized 
government). Finally, a suit may not be brought against one of the states of the United 
States without its consent. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) 
(the need for such consent is clearly implied from U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 1). 
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maintain an antitrust suit2 for treble damages remained un-
resolved until the Supreme Court decided Pfizer v. Government 
of lndia8 in 1978. In Pfizer, the Court held that a foreign sover-
eign could recover treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton 
Act' in an antitrust action. The Court thus made a major policy 
decision which could have far-reaching political and economic 
effects.5 
After summarizing the rationale behind Pfizer, this article will 
trace the ramifications of the decision on American foreign, eco-
nomic, and antitrust policies. Second, a suggestion for a foreign 
sovereign antitrust bill will then be offered. Finally, an examina-
tion of present congressional proposals will show that these pro-
posals fail to address fully the political and economic conse-
quences of Pfizer. 
I. Pfizer v. Government of India 
Pfizer was a case of first impression on the issue of whether a 
foreign nation could sue for treble damages under section 4 of 
the Clayton Act in an antitrust action.8 
1 Foreign sovereigns have maintained suits under common law for unfair competition 
and trademark infringement. See French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 
U.S. 427 (1903); La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 94 F. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 
102 F. 153 (2d Cir. 1900); City of Carlsbad v. Schultz, 78 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1897); City of 
Carlsbad v. Kutnow, 68 F. 794 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 71 F. 167 (2d Cir. 1895). 
1 434 U.S. 308 (1978). Pfizer was one of nine antitrust suits claiming treble damages 
initiated by the foreign governments of India, West Germany, Spain, Vietnam, Colom-
bia, Iran, the Philippines, Korea, and Kuwait against several pharmaceutical firms for 
fixing the price of certain broad spectrum antibiotics. The actions were consolidated for 
pre-trial purposes in the District Court of Minnesota. See In re Antibiotic Drugs, 320 F. 
Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970). 
• Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the 
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an 
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold 
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee. 
15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976). 
• Contra, Houser & Rigler, Antitrust and the Foreign Government Trader: The Impact 
of Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 10 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 719 (1978). The authors, 
former counsel for the Philippines in the antibiotic antitrust cases, argue that the effects 
of Pfizer will be minimal. 
• The question of whether a foreign government could sue for treble damages was first 
decided in In re Antiobiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which 
the court held that a foreign nation could maintain a suit for treble damages. The court 
based its ruling on the rationale employed by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Evans, 
316 U.S. 159 (1942), viewing a foreign sovereign as more similar to a state than to the 
United States. See text accompanying notes 26-30 infra. In a cursory opinion, Judge Lord 
stated that he could "perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to deprive a 
foreign nation, as purchaser of commodities shipped in foreign commerce, of the civil 
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A. The Majority Opinion 
407 
The question of whether a foreign government was entitled to 
sue for treble damages turned upon the statutory interpretation 
of the word "person" in section 4 of the Clayton Act. 7 Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted the dearth of both 
statutory provisions and legislative history to shed light on the 
definition of "person. "8 The Court felt that the available legisla-
tive history evidenced a congressional intent that the term "any 
person" should have a "naturally" broad and inclusive meaning 
so as to embrace foreign sovereigns.' 
remedy of treble damages which is available to other foreign purchasers who suffer 
through violation of the Act." 333 F. Supp. at 317. The district court certified an interloc-
utory appeal which was granted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. An inter-
vening settlement caused the court to dismiss the case without prejudice. ANTrrauST & 
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 697, A-23 (Jan. 21, 1975). In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 
612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976), the drug companies sought review 
of Judge Lord's holding in favor of foreign sovereigns on the treble damage question in 
the Philippines case, Order No. 74-31 (D. Minn. 1974), cited in ANTrrausT & TRADE REG. 
REP. (BNA) No. 697, A-23 (Jan. 21, 1975). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
missed the appeal on a procedural ground and thus never considered the merits of the 
claim. 
7 See note 4 supra. 
• "[I]t seems apparent that the question was never considered at the time the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts were enacted." 434 U.S. at 312. 
' 434 U.S. at 315-18. The dissenting opinion stated that the majority "[converted] ... 
this silence in 1890 into an affir~ative intent in 1978." 434 U.S. at 325 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
Statutory construction is not an easy task. In an early article, for example, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter aptly commented: 
The difficulty in many instances where a problem of meaning arises is that the 
enactment was not directed towards the troubling question. The problem might 
then be stated, as once it was by Mr. Justice Cardozo, "which choice is the more 
likely that Congress would have made?" While in its context the significance and 
limitations of this question are clear, thus to frame the question too often tempts 
inquiry into the subjective and might seem to warrant the court in giving an-
swers based on an unmanifested legislative state of mind. But the purpose which 
a court must effectuate is not that which Congress should have enacted or would 
have. It is that which it did enact, however inaptly, because it may fairly be said 
to be imbedded in the statute, even if a specific manifestation was not thought 
of, as is often the very reason for casting a statute in very general terms. 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 539 
(1947). 
The Supreme Court decided Pfizer in the absence of a clear legislative intent. This 
judicial exercise of legislative power troubled both the Court of Appeals and members of 
the Supreme Court. The majority in Pfizer referred to a letter from the Legal Advisor of 
the Department of State to the effect that "the Department of State would not anticipate · 
any foreign policy problems if ... foreign governments [were held to be] 'persons' within 
the meaning of the Clayton Act §4." 434 U.S. at 319 n.20. The Court therefore felt that it 
was free to rule on the issue. Mr. Justice Powell pointed out, however, that the question 
had "economic and social ramifications" which were beyond the jurisdiction of the De-
partment of State and could be decided only by Congress. Id. at 331 n.2 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
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1. The foreign government as a consumer-The Court re-
jected the argument that the two peculiar attributes of a foreign 
government, that it is both foreign and sovereign, would exclude 
it from the definition of person. The Court reasoned that the 
Sherman10 and Clayton11 Acts expressly included foreign entities 
despite the strong protectionist attitude of the Congress which 
enacted the statutes. Foreign corporations clearly have a right to 
treble damages because the definition includes "corporations 
and associations existing under or authorized by ... the laws of 
any foreign country."12 Thus, the Court wrote, Congress could 
not have intended to protect only the American consumers but 
foreign consumers as well. 13 The Court found that allowing for-
eign suits would carry out two purposes of the treble damage 
remedy, namely, deterrence of future illegality and compensa-
tion for injury .14 It also stressed the benefit to the American con-
sumer of allowing a foreign government this remedy; suits 
brought by foreign nations would serve to lower prices world-
wide, lessen the rate of international inflation, and reduce prices 
in the American markets.15 
2. The foreign government as sovereign-On two occasions 
prior to Pfizer, the Court had considered the right of a sovereign 
to maintain an antitrust action for treble damages. United 
States v. Cooper Corp. 18 and Georgia v. Evans 17 dealt respec-
tively with the right of the United States and the right of an 
Mr. Justice Powell spoke strongly against the Court's action: 
I had thought it was accepted doctrine that questions of "general pol-
icy" -especially with respect to foreign sovereigns and absent explicit legislative 
authority-are beyond the province of the Judicial Branch. If the statute truly 
reflected a general policy that dictated the inclusion of foreign sovereigns, the 
Court might be justified in reach ing today's result . . . . 
. . . A court, without the benefit of legislative hearings that would illuminate the 
policy considerations if the question were left to Congress, is not competent in 
my opinion to resolve this question in the best interests of our country. It is 
regrettable that the Court today finds it necessary to rush to this essentially leg-
islative judgment. 
Id. at 330-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Pfizer v. Gov't of India, 550 F.2d 396, 399-
400 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross, J., concurring), atf'd, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
IO 15 u.s.c. §§ 1-7 (1976). 
11 15 u.s.c. §§ 12-27 (1976). 
12 15 u.s.c. §§ 7, 12 (1976). 
13 Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 313-14. 
14 Id. at 314-15. 
15 Id. at 315 n.14. It is important to note that the majority based its economic analysis 
in large part upon a law review article, Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 25 
CATH. U.L. REv. 1 (1975). The author, a former counsel for the government of India in the 
early stages of the Pfizer litigation, was actively advocating the cause of his client but 
failed to substantiate any of his economic arguments. 
11 312 U.S. 600 (1941). 
" 316 U.S. 159 (1942). 
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individual state to bring treble damage actions under section 7 of 
the Sherman Act. 18 Each of these cases turned upon the statu-
tory interpretation of a "person" within the meaning of section 7 
of the Sherman Act. 
In Cooper, the Court held that the United States was not a 
"person" and, therefore, could not maintain a treble damage ac-
tion.19 The Court reasoned that, because the Sherman Act cre-
ated new rights and remedies, recourse to the remedies could ac-
crue only to those on whom those new rights were conferred. 20 
The Court noted that while it is not a "hard and fast" rule of 
exclusion, the phrase "person," as commonly used, does not in-
clude a sovereign. Statutes employing the term are generally 
construed to exclude the federal government. 21 The definition's 
sweeping inclusion of various entities strengthened the Court's 
findings. According to the Court, if Congress had intended to in-
clude the United States, it would have done so expressly.22 
In addition, the Court looked to the legislative history, which 
it found "persuasive" on the issue.23 Senator Sherman, the origi-
nal proponent of the bill, declared that the damage recovery was 
a right conferred only on a private party and not on the federal 
government. 24 Two additional factors which influenced the 
Court's decision were the federal government's recourse to other 
criminal and civil remedies to enforce the antitrust laws and the 
feeling that· the United States does not and should not need the 
monetary incentive of treble damages to prosecute violations. u 
The Court came to a different conclusion in Evans, holding 
that a state falls within the definition of a "person" and can re-
cover a treble damage award. 29 Considerably less legislative his-
tory existed to enlighten the Court as to congressional intent 
with respect to the status of states in antitrust litigation than 
existed with respect to status of the federal government. The 
Court instead turned to the legislative history to determine what 
remedies were available to states injured by an antitrust viola-
tion. It concluded that, if a state were denied an action for treble 
damages, it would be remediless.27 In 1914 Congress had rejected 
" 15 u.s.c. § 7 (1976). 
" United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 614 (1941). 
20 Id. at 610-12. 
ZI Id. 
zz Id. at 607. 
zs Id. at 611. 
"' 21 CONG. REc. 2563-64 (1890). 
111 United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 614 (1941). 
11 Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942). 
17 Id. 
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I 
an amendment to allow states to institute criminal proceedings 
in the name of the United States to enforce the antitrust laws.28 
The Court in Evans could thus "perceive no reason for believing 
that Congress wanted to deprive a State, as a purchaser of goods 
shipped in interstate commerce, of the civil remedy of treble 
damages which is available to other purchasers who suffer 
through violation of the Act. " 21 
The Pfizer Court chose to follow the analysis of Evans. Rea-
soning that because the antitrust laws denied foreign nations, 
like states, the alternative remedies available to the United 
States, the Court held that a foreign nation should have recourse 
to the treble damage remedy. 30 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion vigoro1,1sly criti-
cized the majority's "undisguised exercise of legislative power."31 
The silence of the statute as to foreign sovereigns when com-
pared with its express inclusion of foreign corporations was, ac-
cording to the dissent, dispositive of the issue;32 Congress did not 
intend to extend the treble damage remedy to foreign govern-
ments. The dissenting Justice did not view the exclusion of for-
eign soverigns as inconsistent with the explicit inclusion of for-
eign corporations; a foreign government enjoys immunity from 
suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity while a foreign 
corporation does not. The dissenting opinion reasoned that this 
difference in susceptibility to suit should account for the unequal 
treatment of the two entities.33 This view gains additional sup-
port from the legislative history of the Webb-Pomerene Act,34 
which indicates that Congress intended to protect American con-
sumers at the expense of foreign markets. 311 · 
The dissent thus rejected the Evans rationale as it applied to 
28 51 CoNG. R.Ec. 14519, 14527 (1914). 
21 Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942). 
so Quoting the Evans decision, the Court stated: "We can perceive no reason for believs 
ing that Congress wanted to deprive a [foreign nation], as purchaser of commodities 
shipped in [international] commerce, of the civil remedy of treble damages which is 
available to other purchasers who suffer through violation of the Act." 434 U.S. at 318 
(quoting Evans, 316 U.S. at 162-63). 
See also the closely similar language in Judge Lord's opinion in In re Antibiotic Anti-
trust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 314, 317 (S.D.N.Y 1971). 
11 434 U.S. at 320 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See note 9 supra. 
12 Id. at 321-22. 
13 Id. at 322. 
u Pub. L. No. 126, 40 Stat. 516 (1918) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976)) . 
.. 434 U.S. at 322-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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foreign sovereigns. Unlike an individual state of the United 
States, whose actions are constrained by the supremacy and 
commerce clauses of the United State Consitution, a foreign na-
tion remains free to enact its own antitrust laws and impose its 
own sanctions. 38 The dissent also discussed various measures 
such as boycotts and price-fixing which were "weapons in the 
arsenals of foreign nations which no domestic State could ever 
employ. "37 
Finally, the dissent focused on the two major inequities cre-
ated by the majority decision. The decision would allow a foreign 
nation which engages in anticompetitive behavior to sue an 
American company for practicing the same methods and recover 
treble damages. The second anomaly is that a foreign govern-
ment may enjoy a remedy which has been explicitly denied our 
own government in Cooper. 38 
II. RAMIFICATIONS OF Pfizer 
The decision that a foreign government should enjoy a cause of 
action for treble damages under the American antitrust laws has 
wide-ranging economic and foreign policy consequences. The 
character of international trade is undergoing a rapid transfor-
mation, with a marked increase in commercial transactions be-
tween the public and private sectors.39 A number of govern-
ments, trading partners, and allies, developed and less developed 
countries alike, are assuming roles previously played only by pri-
vate industry. It is no longer surprising to find the "nation-
S1 Id. at 326-27. 
17 Id. at 327-28. 
18 Id. at 328. For a discussion of this aspect of Cooper, see notes 19-25 and accompany-
ing text supra. 
SI See Letter from Timothy W. Stanley, President, International Economic Policy As-
sociation, to Honorable Walter Flowers (June 24, 1976), reprinted in Jurisdiction of U.S. 
Court in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on 
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976). The letter states: 
In the resource area, state-owned firms now predominate in the oil field in 
many developing countries: two of the new entrants on Fortune magazine's list of 
the 50 largest industrial companies in the world, Petrobras and National Iranian 
Oil Company are state owned. National agricultural marketing boards are play-
ing an increasing direct role in grain trade; in shipping, many developing coun-
tries are buying national fleets which are operated as state monopolies; and of 
course, most international airlines have long been state-controlled entities. 
States are also becoming involved in the creation of industrial conglomerates 
which buy, sell, and invest in the U.S. and elsewhere abroad through companies 
such as Sonatrach of Algeria, Pertamina of Indonesia, or I.V.P. of Venezuela. 
Id. at 71. See also B. BALASSA, CHANGING PATl'ERNS IN FOREIGN 'I'RADE AND PAYMENTS 55-
126 (3d ed. 1978). 
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trader" involved in the areas of medicine, oil production, or steel 
manufacture.'0 Thus, the foreign commerce facet of the Ameri-
can antitrust laws takes on new significance. 
Two questions must be considered in the following evaluation 
of the foreign, economic, and antitrust policies of the United 
States with respect to· the l'fizer decision: whether foreign states 
should have access to the American courts on the same basis as 
domestic individuals and whether a foreign sovereign should be 
allowed treble damages if it brings suit for antitrust violations. 
A. American Foreign Policy: International Antitrust Goals 
and the Spirit of Comity 
A major tenet of American foreign policy is the encouragement 
of free trade throughout the world. ' 1 This free market sentiment 
is more than diplomatic rhetoric. The American attempt to pro-
mote international competition has taken two forms.'2 The first 
thrust of American foreign policy, which has yet to bear fruit, 
has been to establish a formal international antitrust treaty.'3 
The United States has been reluctant, however, to ratify various 
United Nations proposals for such an agreement. Such reluc-
tance does not stem from neglect of a commitment to free world 
trade. Rather, as the American representative to the United Na-
tions explained in 1955, the United States government concluded 
that the differences which presumably existed in national poli-
40 See Velvel, supra note 15, at 4. 
41 See, e.g., the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, which states: 
In the realization that additional measures of international economic cooperation 
are necessary to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade and render most effective the operations of the [International Monetary] 
Fund and the [World] Bank, it is declared to be the policy of the United States 
to seek to bring about further agreement and cooperation among nations and 
international bodies, as soon as possible, on ways and means which will best 
reduce obstacles to and restrictions upon international trade, eliminate unfair 
trade practices, promote mutually advantageous conmmercial relations, and oth-
erwise facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade and 
promote the stability of international economic relations. 
22 U.S.C. § 286k (1976). 
42 K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 34 (1958). 
41 For discussion as to the history and effectiveness of attempts to form an interna-
tional antitrust mechanism, see W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 
(1973); Davidow, Some Reflections on the OECD Competition Guidelines, 22 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 441 (1977); Joelson, The Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to 
Restrictive Business Practices, 8 LAW & PoL. INT'L Bus. 837 (1976); Montague, Limita-
tions On What the UN Can Do Successfully: The Proposed UN Program on Restrictive 
Business Practices, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 441 (1955); Timberg, Restrictive Business Prac-
tices as an Appropriate Subject for United Nations Action, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 409 (1955); 
Zieler, The Work of the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, 
19 ANrrrRuST BULL. 289 (1974). 
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cies and practices in the antitrust field were sufficiently great 
that the agreement then proposed would have been neither satis-
factory nor effective in eliminating harmful restraints on interna-
tional trade. 44 At the same time, the spokesman reaffirmed the 
United States' objective to promote free trade.45 More recently, 
the United States has participated in the issuance of a Code of 
Conduct for Multinational Enterprises and in the UNCTAD pro-
ject of developing standards of prohibited restrictive business 
practices. 48 
The second, and by far the more successful approach, has been 
to promote competition as part of our economic cooperation and 
mutual security treaties. The Panama Canal Treaty, 47 for exam-
ple, forbade the passage through the canal of any ship owned or 
controlled by a company violating the Sherman Act. Many post-
World War II treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation 
have included anti-cartel provisions. 48 The United States has 
also negotiated many bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements. 
Since 1958 the United States and Canada have engaged in a 
practice of weekly consultation on antitrust investigations. In 
1976, the United States and Germany signed an agreement for 
mutual cooperation and exchange of information on antitrust 
matters. '9 The spirit of international comity50 appears to suggest 
that the United States open its courts to other nations in fur-
therance of this international antitrust policy. 
Unrestricted access to an American remedy as promulgated by 
the Pfizer decision, however, runs counter to the American policy 
of encouraging nations to develop their own antitrust laws. By 
permitting foreign nations to rely on American courts rather 
" Montague, supra note 43, at 458-59. 
41 Id. 
" See Rosenthal, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in US. Export Trade, 71 AM. Soc'v INT'L 
L. Paoc. 214, 218-19 (1977). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 31 (1973) states: 
No vessel permitted to engage in the coastwise or foreign trade of the United 
States shall be permitted to enter or pass through the Panama Canal if such ship 
is owned, chartered, operated, or controlled by any person or company which is 
doing business in violation of the provisions of section 1 to 11 of [the Sherman 
Act] or of any other Act of Congress amending or supplementing the same. 
" See, e.g., ltalo-American Commercial Treaty of 1948, United States-Italy, art. XVIII 
(3), T.S. No. 1965; Economic Cooperation Agreement between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, art. II (3), July 6, 1948, T.S. No. 1795; Economic Cooperation Agree-
ment with the Government of Vietnam, Sept. 7, 1951, United States-Vietnam, 2 U.S.T. 
2205, 2207, T.I.A.S. No. 2346; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with the Repub-
lic of Vietnam, April 3, 1961, United States-Republic of Vietnam, 12 U.S.T. 1703, 
T.I.A.S. No. 4890. 
" See Davidow, supra note 43, at 443. 
so See note 1 supra. 
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than to develop their own means for controlling harmful corpo-
rate activity, the United States is actually hindering interna-
tional progress towards a vigorous supranational antitrust pro-
gram. Common sense also suggests that nations should not be 
allowed to prosecute American corporations in United States 
courts for business conduct which is not illegal in their own 
countries. The Pfizer decision should not place the United States 
in the anomolous position of allowing nations that encourage mo-
nopolistic practices to sue American corporations when those na-
tions become the victims of price-fixing. Adding to this irony is 
the fact that the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act-of-
state protect nations such as those that constitute OPEC from 
treble damage actions by American consumers.61 
•• Much ambiguity surrounds the ability of an American plaintiff to sue a foreign gov-
ernment for its anticompetitive practices. See, e.g., Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against 
Government-Inspired Boycotts, Shortages, and Squeezes: Wanderings on the Road to 
Mecca, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 911 (1976); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State 
Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1976); 
Note, Antitrust as an Antidote to the Arab Boycott, 8 LAw & PoL. INT'L Bus. 799 (1974); 
Note, Commercial Obligations Under the Act of State Doctrine, 8 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 
1093 (1974). 
The foreign sovereign immunity doctrine as originally expounded in Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), conferred a blanket immunity on all acts of a foreign gov-
ernment: "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sov-
ereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the 
government of another done within its own territory." Id. at 252. The courts eventually 
rejected the theory of absolute sovereign immunity in favor of a more restrictive theory. 
Under this restrictive theory, a state is immune from prosecution with respect to its pub-
lic acts (''jure imperii'1 but not as to its commercial acts (''jure gestionis'1. See Victory 
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d 
Cir. 1964). Congress eventually codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). See Na-
tional American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
The Act defines a "commercial activity" by "reference to the nature of the course of 
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 
U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). See also [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6604 for an ex-
panded explanation of the purpose of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611. Even if a government is 
found liable for its "commercial activities," it may not be subject to the treble damage 
remedy. Section 1606 of the Act protects a foreign government from "punitive damages" 
and the trebling of antitrust damages may be viewed in part as a punitive action. 
If a domestic plaintiff can overcome the jurisdictional hurdle of the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine, the plaintiff is then faced with the affirmative defense of the act of state 
doctrine. "[A] court in the United States ... will refrain from examining the validity of 
an act of a foreign state by which that state has exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to 
its public interests." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE U.S. § 41 
(1965) [emphasis added]. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964). While the act of state doctrine does not protect all government acts, the scope of 
protection is still broader than the foreign sovereignty immunity doctrine. In Timberline 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), the court enumerated 
many of the factors to be weighed when considering the defense: 
[the] degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of 
the parties and the locations or principal places of busineBS of corporations, the 
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The United States does not, however, wish to punish those na-
tions which do have antitrust laws similar to our own and would 
allow civil suits by the American government. A blanket prohibi-
tion would serve only to antagonize many nations as well as to 
violate the spirit of comity. An additional problem is that the 
United States frequently brings suits in foreign courts, generally 
enjoying the same access to the courts and the same remedies as 
a private litigant enjoys. The Department of Justice established 
the Office of Foreign Litigation for the sole purpose of bringing 
these suits. An overly restrictive approach by Congress on the 
Pfizer issue may spur retaliatory measures by foreign nations to 
restrict recovery by the United States of its foreign claims.52 
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Perma Life Muf-
fl,ers u. International Parts Corp., 53 courts should arguably re-
main indifferent to the character of the plaintiff in antitrust liti-
gation. In striking down the in pari delicto defense, the Court in 
Perma Life found that 
· the plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may 
be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but 
the law encourages his suit to further the overriding pub-
lic policy in favor of competition. A more fastidious re-
gard for the relative moral worth of the parties would 
only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the 
private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement. 54 
There is, however, an important distinction between corpora-
tions and sovereign nations which would render the Perma Life 
rationale inapplicable to foreign sovereigns. The Court was 
apparently willing to do away with the in pari delicto defense 
because "permitting the plaintiff to recover a windfall gain does 
not encourage continued violations by those in his position since 
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compli-
ance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with 
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect 
American commerce, the forseeability of such effect, and the relative importance 
to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with 
conduct abroad. 
Id. at 614. 
Recently, in 1AM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D.' Cal. 1979), the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists brought a class action suit against OPEC. The judge ruled that the 
activities of the OPEC nations in setting the terms and conditions for the removal of 
natural resources from its territories were governmental activities. The nations were thus 
immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 
52 S. REP. No. 96-239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1979). 
53 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
" Id. at 139. 
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they remain fully subject to civil and criminal penalties for their 
own illegal conduct. "55 While a foreign corporation may be subject 
to suit, a foreign sovereign is immune from suit;58 thus, there is no 
such check on its activities. 
B. American Export Policy 
A major goal in American foreign economic policy is the max-
imization of the value of American exports. Congress affirma-
tively supported this policy by enacting the Webb-Pomerene 
Act, 57 which permits certain b(lsiness combinations when export-
ing to foreign countries. 58 More recently, the executive order es-
tablishing the Export Expansion Advisory Committee of the Ex-
port-Import Bank declared: "[f]oreign trade [is] an 
essential and continuing element in sustaining the growth, 
strengh, and prosperity of our economy .. ~ ."59 In 1972, how-
ever, Congress rejected a bill which would have greatly expanded 
the Webb-Pomerene exemptions for restraint of competition in 
exports, in addition to replacing the antitrust enforcement role of 
the Department of Justice in this area with a new enforcement 
system.80 The rejection of this bill does not, however, indicate a 
reversal of congressional intent on the issue of export maximiza-
tion. Rather, it indicates a realization on the part of the legisla-
ture that liberalization of the antitrust laws would not serve to 
maximize the value of American exports.81 American exports 
55 Id. 
51 See note 59 and accompanying text supra . 
., Pub. L. No. 126, 40 Stat. 516 (1918) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976)). 
~ The House Report accompanying this statute stated, in pertinent part, that 
[t]he bill does not authorize any violation of the present antitrust laws. There are 
many great lawyers who think there is nothing in existing laws to prevent Ameri-
can manufacturers and exporters from combining in whatever manner they 
please in foreign countries to dispose of their products, but other lawyers take 
the position that there is doubt about this power, and in order to absolutely 
clarify the situation and in common fairness to our American exporters we pre-
sent this bill. The bill prohibits the slightest violation of our antitrust laws 
within the United States, but makes it clear that American exporters doing busi-
ness in foreign countries are to be allowed to do business in those foreign coun-
tries according to the foreign laws. 
H.R. REP. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1917). 
51 12 U.S.C. § 635j note, Exec. Order No.11420 (1968). 
'° S.2754, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
11 Miles Kirkpatrick, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, testified before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism that Webb-Pomerene activi-
ties were unlikely to expand American export activity. According to Kirkpatrick, permit-
ting American corporations greater freedom in forming export cartels was more likely to 
result in a retardation of the growth of American exports in addition to the adverse spill-
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would be more successful in a competitive world trade atmos-
phere. Thus, the thrust of American policy should be to break 
down the artificial barriers to trade which hinder the ability of 
American exports to compete successfully abroad.82 This goal can 
in part be served by encouraging foreign nations to develop and 
use their own antitrust laws not merely against American enter-
prises but against all companies which engage in anticompetitive 
practices. 83 · 
Furthermore, denying treble damages and demanding reci-
procity could serve to protect American exporters from discrimi-
natory restraints. American corporations would no longer have to 
bear the burden of being singled out for retributory antitrust ac-
tions. The danger of double recovery84 under both American and 
foreign laws would also be diminished. This policy would enable 
American corporations to maximize the long-term value of their 
products in a competitive international market and still protect 
consumers by forcing the exporters to obey the laws of the 
United States and of the foreign importing nations. 
over effects on the American consumer. Firms would have greater incentives to fix prices 
and cut production rather than increase the volume of their exports. Hearings on S. 2754 
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Commerce 
Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 232-35 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Export Expansion Hear-
ings]. Despite the clamoring of American business, no concrete examples of how Ameri-
can antitrust laws hinder businesses' ability to compete abroad have come to light. See 
Export Expansion Hearings, supra at 807-16 (1972) (testimony of Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General Walker B. Comegys), reprinted in [1972] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 150,129; 
Address by Thomas E. Kauper, Ass't. Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the 
New York Bar Ass'n, New York City (Jan. 24, 1973), reprinted in [1973] 5 TRADE REG. 
REP. (CCH) t50,160 at 55,280; Address by Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy Planning, 
Antitrust Division, before the New York Bar Ass'n, New York City (Jan. 24, 1973), re-
printed in [1973] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) t50,161 at 55,284; Address by Keith I. 
Clearwaters, Special Ass't to the Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the 
Ass'n of General Counsel, Hot Springs, Virginia (May 4, 1973), reprinted in [1973) 5 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) t50,169 at 55,300. See generally Rahl, American Antitrust and 
Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974); Baker, Antitrust 
and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, id. at 16; Rahl, A Rejoinder, id. at 
42. 
n A 1968 study by the Bureau of International Commerce listed types of government 
action which the companies surveyed felt would most encourage export expansion: devel-
opment of tax incentives for exports, improvements of credit and insurance for exports, 
removal of nontariff barriers, tariff cuts, reduction of domestic inflation and transport 
costs, and elimination of foreign direct investment restrictions. Export Expansion Hear-
ings, supra note 68, at 281 (statement of Bruce W. Rohrbacher, Director, McKinsey & 
Co.). 
a As the counsel for the defense in Pfizer argued, "By hastening to grant foreign gov-
ernments a cause of action under our laws, the Court encourages them to rely on those 
laws to punish their American suppliers, rather than to enact their own antitrust Jaws, 
which they might apply uniformly against all their suppliers, not just American compa-
nies." Petition for Rehearing, No. 76-749 (October term 1977) at 8, Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of 
India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
14 See text accompanying note 95 infra. 
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C. Domestic Economic Considerations 
The unrestricted treble damage remedy given to a foreign gov-
ernment may have serious immediate and cumulative repercus-
sions on the American domestic economy. The sheer size of a 
damage award may severely cripple, if not bankrupt, a losing 
corporation. 85 Although this is also possible in domestic suits, 
damages in antitrust suits by governments tend to be greater 
than in other cases because government contracts are larger than 
ordinary corporate contracts. For example, one of the nine liti-
gants in Pfizer estimated its damages to be in the area of $10 
million before trebling.88 
If a company which must pay such an award has as a result to 
raise prices, stop production, or curtail its expansion effort, the 
American economy bears the brunt of the loss in unemployment 
and inflation. 87 When dealing with foreign nations, Congress 
should fashion legislation which will compensate the victim but 
not do irreparable harm to the offending company and indirectly 
to the American public. A second effect of a treble damage 
award to a foreign government is the loss to the federal govern-
ment of taxes on the awards. While a foreign corporation which 
recovers treble damages is subject to federal income tax,88 a for-
eign government is not. 89 The cumulative tax loss thus may be 
45 See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw vol. II, 32-33 (1978). Some of the cost of 
treble damage award can be shifted onto the federal treasury, as treble damages are gen• 
erally deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense under federal income tax 
law. Rev. Ru!. 64-224, 1964-2 C.B. 52. I.R.C. § 162(g) limits this deduction by prohibiting 
any deduction for two-thirds of the amount paid when the defendant is subsequently 
convicted or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a related criminal charge. The deduction 
does not, however, vitiate the effects of the treble damage award completely. A corpora-
tion may not generate sufficient taxable income to take advantage of the deduction. The 
deduction also does not aid companies which have restricted cash flows. 
For an interesting article concerning the effects of the tax law on antitrust enforce-
ment, see Wright, A Tax Formula to Restore the Historical Effects of the Antitrust 
Treble Damage Provisions, 65 MICH. L. REv. 245 (1966). 
11 When Foreign Nations Sue Under Antitrust, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 26. 
17 The American economy also suffers if a domestic antitrust suit places a substantial 
burden on an American business. An important distinction exists, however, between a 
domestic and a foreign plaintiff. The United States may be willing to experience disloca-
tion in one sector of the economy in order to redress a harm which occurred in another 
domestic sector of the economy. Where the plaintiff is a foreign sovereign, the domestic 
economy suffers when relief is provided in a remote area where the benefits, if any, to the 
American economy are secondary. 
11 See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); accord, I.RC. §§ 
881, 882. 
•• See I.RC. § 892; Rev. Ru!. 75-298, 1975-2 C.B. 290. Recently the Commissioner of 
the Internal Revenue Service proposed new regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,111 (1978), sub-
jecting to federal tax the income derived by a foreign sovereign from commercial activi-
ties in the United States. The regulations, if enacted, would tax only a small percentage 
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quite large. Finally, the exodus of American currency abroad has 
an adverse effect on both the balance of payments and on capital 
investment in the United States. This type of harm may occur 
when a foreign corporaton or even a domestic corporation re-
ceives a damage award because there is no guarantee that these 
companies will spend the money in the United States. With re-
spect to corporations, this problem could be solved by having the 
court fashion a decree prohibiting the plaintiff from investing the 
treble damage award abroad. When applied to a foreign govern-
ment, however, the same type of decree is a severe infringement 
upon its sovereignty and would serve only to antagonize it. When 
a sovereign sues in an antitrust action, it is seeking to redress a 
wrong done to its people and thus would most likely want to use 
the damage award as it sees fit rather than in a manner dictated 
by an American court. 
D. American Antitrust Policy 
1. Protection of the American consumer-The protection of 
the American consuming public is one of the major purposes of 
antitrust enforcement in international commerce.70 Supporters of 
treble damages for foreign nations advance three economic argu-
ments concerning harm to the American consumer: (1) to deny a 
foreign government a treble damage action encourages illegal 
conspiracies which raise worldwide prices and accelerate Ameri-
can inflation; (2) foreign manufacturers who may be able to un-
dercut monopoly prices are discouraged from entering into the 
American market; and (3) without such a penalty, the conspira-
tors would be able to amass a "war chest" of ill-gotten gain to 
finance domestic cartels and defend against legal action. 71 
The arguments of increased inflation and illegal activities aris-
ing out of the unchecked conspiratorial practices of American 
and foreign companies, while ominous, do not support the con-
clusion that the United States must give foreign governments 
the treble damage remedy accorded them in Pfizer. The same 
problems can be solved more expediently by encouraging foreign 
nations to develop antitrust laws of their own. Presumably, the 
American consumer receives the same benefits whether an illegal 
conspirator is punished abroad or in the United States. The 
of treble damage awards received by foreign governments. 
'
0 Antitrust Division, Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 4-5 
(Jan. 1977), reprinted in PERSPECTIV~ ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. AN-
TITRUST AND OTHER LAws, Appendix No. 2 (J. Griffin ed. 1979). 
71 Velvel, supra note 15, at 7-8. 
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American consumer is in fact better off in the long run if more 
nations develop antitrust laws which can be applied to all con-
spirators instead of only American wrongdoers. If the number of 
national antitrust laws is increased, the need for greater enforce-
ment and procedural cooperation might eventually lead to supra-
national antitrust agreements. 72 If international antitrust activity 
is expanded, it would become increasingly more difficult for con-
spirators to establish monopolistic prices which would contribute 
to inflation, discourage competition, and finance "war chests." 
2. Enforcement-The treble damage award, apart from being 
a remedy,73 has two additional purposes. It acts first as an incen-
tive to encourage antitrust litigation to aid the federal govern-
ment in enforcing its antitrust policies. 74 Second, treble damages 
supposedly act as a major deterrent to antitrust activity.75 Any 
alternative to the foreign government treble damage suit should 
contain these remedial, incentive, and deterrent elements of cur-
rent antitrust law. 
III. A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
To deal most satisfactorily with the economic, social, and po-
litical problems which arise when a foreign nation sues an Amer-
ican company in an American court, the statutory response to 
Pfizer should include the following three features: a limitation of 
recovery to single damages, a requirement of general reciprocity, 
and an additional prerequisite of exhaustion of local remedies. 
A. Single Damages 
Congress found it distasteful to offer the United States a mon-
etary incentive to enforce the law.78 Similarly, a foreign govern-
ment should not require a reward to protect its own best inter-
ests or those of its own people. The compensation afforded by a 
single damage recovery should pe a sufficient incentive to prose-
cute the claim. 77 Moreover, the aid of foreign governments is not 
n See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business 
Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8291. 
73 In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977), the 
Court acknowledged that while treble damages do have a deterrent effect, "the treble-
damages provision ... is designed primarily as a remedy." 
" P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 65, vol. II, at 149-50. 
75 Id. at 150. 
71 See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955). 
77 Of course, for a capital-poor nation, the prospect of treble damages may mean the 
difference between suing and not suing. Lack of an American antitrust remedy, however, 
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essential to American enforcement of its antitrust laws. Indeed, 
as in Pfizer, 18 foreign nations are much more likely to "tag 
along" once a major suit has been instituted than to initiate a 
suit themselves. Antitrust violations have previously been effec-
tively uncovered without the presence of foreign nation plain-
tiffs. 79 Little danger therefore exists that antitrust laws will go 
unenforced. 
In addition, by limiting the recovery to single damages, many 
of the adverse effects of awarding large treble damage awards to 
foreign governments would diminish.80 A company in violation of 
the law would merely return those monies which were taken from 
that country illegally. This would reduce the danger that the 
company would suffer serious financial harm. Furthermore, the 
domestic economy would experience fewer of the attendant 
harms associated with large recoveries. 
By limiting recovery, certain circumstances, such as those 
found in Pfizer, would also be less likely to recur. India, one of 
the principal plaintiffs, admitted in the early stages of litigation 
that a major reason for its decision to sue under American rather 
than Indian law was to acquire hard American currency to help 
its balance of payments.81 The American antitrust laws were not 
intended to fill the coffers of foreign governments and should not 
be used for this purpose. 
The additional deterrent effect of the treble damage claim 
when a government is plaintiff is questionable. No evidence has 
been found which suggests that the prospect of a government 
suit for actual damages is less of a deterrent than a private 
treble damage remedy, especially in view of alternative govern-
ment civil and criminal remedies.82 Some scholars have even sug-
gested that reparations-induced private antitrust actions are the 
least efficient method to counter anticompetitive activities.83 
does not deny a foreign nation alternate remedies. See notes 93-104 and accompanying 
text infra. 
711 See Joint Brief for the Petitioners at 38, Pfizer v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
71 Private treble damage suits have increased markedly in the last ten years. See (1977] 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AoMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS, Table 20 ("Antitrust Cases Commenced, Statistical Years 1960-1977"). 
"' See part Il C supra. 
" See Petition for Certiorari at 9, 13-15, 19-20, Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 
308 (1978). 
12 The Cooper Court did not suggest that denial of treble damages to the United States 
would encourage companies dealing with the government to violate the antitrust laws. 
United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600 (1941). See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra. 
113 See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties & Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic 
Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1973); Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Eco-
nomic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 329 (1974). In 
the latter article, the authors state: 
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The requirement of general reciprocity, that foreign nations 
themselves prohibit the same business conduct complained of 
and that the United States has a right to bring civil claims in 
the other nations' courts, would help to balance the conflicting 
foreign policy goals. The United States would encourage nations 
to develop their own antitrust laws and to enforce them against 
all firms equally. At the same time, foreign sovereigns would 
have access, albeit somewhat limited, to American courts. The 
United States would reserve the right to exclude those nations 
which engage in anticompetitive practices84 but would not in-
fringe upon a nations' sovereignty in the formulation of its own 
laws. 
1. The sovereignty of foreign governments-The United 
States has been careful to recognize the sovereignty of a foreign 
government in the administration of the latter's laws. Each na-
tion possesses its own economic philosophy which necessarily 
may conflict with that of other nations, at times to the point of 
open antagonism.85 A government applies its laws in a manner 
calculated to maximize the benefits to its own society. In gen-
eral, the acts of American citizens in a foreign nation are subject 
to the law of that nation.88 Antitrust law should be no exception 
[F)rom an efficiency standpoint the present reliance upon reparations to private 
parties in antitrust enforcement has three defects. First, if expected payments to 
plaintiffs do not completely deter monopolistic activity, private actions are a fer-
tile source of perverse incentives. Second, the use of reparations to stimulate 
private actions generates misinformation in the form of nuisance suits. The third 
serious defect of treble damage suits is that real resources are utilized not only in 
the conviction of violations but in the determination of damages. 
Id. at 344. 
The authors argue for a new system of enforcement which places a heavy reliance on 
financial penalties rather than on the probability of detection and conviction. They pro-
pose a system of fines similar to those in some European countries based on percentages 
of company profits. Given the general risk aversion of American management, high fine 
levels work to deter management even with low probabilities of detection and conviction. 
See Breit & Elzinger, Antitrust Penalties & Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analy-
sis, supra. 
"' "Anticompetitive practices" include such restraints of trade as price-fixing and mar-
ket-sharing. The OPEC nations are clear examples of nations engaging in anticompeti-
tive practices. 
" One such conflict has been in the area of enforcement jurisdiction. Orders by Ameri-
can courts to produce in the United States documents kept abroad have provoked ad-
verse official reactions abroad. More than one foreign government has enacted legislation 
whereby removal of records in response to a foreign subpoena is an offense. REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965). See, e.g., In Re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9, Comment F (1971); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., §§ 20, 30 (1965). 
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to this rule. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 81 the 
first antitrust case to involve an extraterritorial question, the Su-
preme Court said, "the general and almost universal rule is that 
the character of the act as lawful or unlawful must be deter-
mined wholly by the law of the country where the act is 
done .... "88 This doctrine was later modified by Judge Learnea 
Hand in the Alcoa case, 89 in which he observed that "any state 
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its alle-
giance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences 
within its borders which the state reprehends .... " 90 American 
law clearly recognizes the right of foreign sovereigns to punish 
illegal acts which take place in or have effects within their own 
nations. 
The United States should therefore not try to seduce foreign 
nations into relying on American law for remedy and enforce-
ment in the antitrust area. Unlike the states, which have relin-
quishe0d part of their sovereign powers to the United States, 
these foreign governments owe no allegiance to the United States 
government. In turn, Congress has not assumed any responsibil-
ity for protecting the _economic welfare of foreign states by any 
means whatsoever, much less by an extension of American anti-
trust laws to the degree sanctioned in Pfizer. The policy of one 
nation may be to attack that which another has vowed to pro-
tect. Many nations, for example, prefer to bolster infant industry 
or increase short-term profits while sacrificing consumer choice. 91 
In Pfizer, for example, each of the defendant drug manufactur-
ers was doing business and held industrial patents in each of the 
nations which brought suit. The majority of the purchases oc-
curred in foreign markets. 92 Each of these foreign governments 
remained free to deal with the conspirators under its own law. 
The United States was under no obligation to offer these nations 
a treble damage remedy. 
2. Alternative antitrust remedies-Forcing a foreign nation to 
rely on its own judicial system for redress of antitrust harms does 
not leave it without a remedy. These nations have remedies 
apart from a suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Many na-
87 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
88 Id. at 356 (emphasis added). 
" United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Su-
preme Court approved this theory of the extraterritorial application of American anti-
trust laws in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 
(1962). . 
'° United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
11 See Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 218-19. 
12 Petition for Rehearing at 8, Pfizer v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
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tions have recourse to their own antitrust laws. West Germany, 
for example, which filed an amicus curiae brief in Pfizer urging 
the applicability of the treble damage remedy, has antitrust laws 
which include penalties such as injunctions, fines, and stringent 
price regulation. 93 The Common Market's Treaty of Rome estab-
lishes further economic regulation.84 In fact, at the time of the 
Pfizer litigation, an antitrust suit alleging many of the same 
charges found in the American suit was in progress in West Ger-
many. 95 The Phillipines and India have also enacted antitrust 
laws.98 Some commentators have even called antitrust law one of 
America's "most successful exports."97 Foreign nations may also 
secure jurisdiction over foreign corporations to restrict extraterri-
torial business practices which affect their economies. 98 
13 See, e.g., Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen [Act Against Restraints of 
Competition) [hereinafter cited as GWB]; Law of July 27, 1957, [1957) Bundesgesetzblatt 
[BGBlJ I 1081, as amended by Law of Aug. 3, 1973, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 917 (W. 
Ger.). 
" Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, arts. 85-
99, 294 U.N.T.S. 2. See also A. CROTTI, TRADING UNDER EEC AND US ANTITRUST LAws 
(1977); J. CUNNINGHAM, RF.STRICTIVE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES IN E.E.C. LAW (1973). 
,. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 327 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
" PHILIPPINF.S REV. PENAL CODE, art. 186 (1972); India Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act (1969), 14 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 657 (1972). 
11 See Davidow, Extraterritorial Applicaton of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing 
World, 8 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 895 (1976): 
In 1954, only eight member nations of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) had enough interest in antitrust law to send a 
delegate to meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices of the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC). The 
antitrust laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and, to some extent, 
those of France were largely the result of pressure from the United States during 
and after World War II. By 1973, antitrust laws embodying principles similar to 
those found in U.S. law had been adopted by more than half of the 23 members 
of OECD. The European Economic Community (EEC), which applies competi-
tion rules to nine members and a number of associate nations, has developed a 
sophisticated and stringent system for the regulation of competition influenced 
by U.S. experience and values. 
During the 1970's, U.S. antitrust principles have served as a model for the 
antitrust laws of a number of nations including India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argen-
tina and even Yugoslavia. 
Id. at 896-97 (citations omitted). See also U.N. CTAD, Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices in Latin America at 9-28, U.N. Doc. ST/MD/4 (1975); U.N. CTAD, Laws and 
Regulations Relating to the Control of Restrictive Practices at 9-41, 56-58, 69-75, U.N. 
Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.5/Misc. 1 (1975) . 
.. See, e.g., GWB, supra note 93, § 98, (2), which applies German law to all restrictive 
behavior "which [has) effects in the territory to which this Act applies, even if they result 
from acts done outside the territory." See also Europemballage Corp. and Continental 
Can Co., Inc. v. Commission of the European Communities, [1973) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
215, 242, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199, 222 (1973). The court stated: "Community law is 
applicable to ... an acquisition which, influences market conditions within the Commu-
nity. The circumstance that [the American company] does not have its registered office 
within the territory of one of the Member States is not sufficient to exclude it from the 
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Even those nations which do not have antitrust laws still have 
effective weapons against conspirators. Retaliatory steps against 
foreign business may include seizures of goods, increasing tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, withdrawals of licenses to do business, or 
refusals to honor licensing agreements or patents. International 
boycotts also have a definite impact on the regulation of foreign 
corporations. 99 
3. Advantages of alternative remedies-Significant advan-
tages accrue to a nation bringing suit in its own courts. The 
expense of bringing a law suit in a foreign nation is often cited as 
a reason for allowing treble damage recoveries in American 
courts. The expense of suing a foreign corporation would be re-
duced by bringing the suit in one's own court system.100 The 
problems of the failure to understand American antitrust law, 
extreme geographical distance, and language difficulties, among 
others, would be largely overcome. Foreign nationals could also 
pursue their own claims more easily. 101 Finally, a foreign nation 
using its own laws might be able to reach more types of anticom-
petitive acts than by relying on American law. For example, a 
American enterprise operating under the Webb-Pomerene Act102 
may engage in restrictive business practices abroad with impu-
nity, provided no spillover effects reach the United States. For-
eign governments can not prosecute that business under Ameri-
can law. They are free, however, to use their own laws. 103 
application of Community Law." Id. at 242, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 222. 
" Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 327-28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
A long-term plan for nations with and without antitrust policies is to do without the 
product now and to search for alternative sources. Monopoly profits, especially in the low 
and medium technology industries, attract new foreign and domestic entrants. Often a 
government could encourage the infant industry with protective measures. Eventually 
the new firms would undercut the monopoly price and institute lower prices. 
Decrease in demand also places a greater strain on the members of a cartel. As demand 
slackens and profits decrease, greater incentive exists for one member to "cheat" on the 
others by lowering his prices to capture a larger share of the market. 
100 The "rigors" of the discovery process can also be mitigated by reciprocal agreements 
calling for cooperation between participant nations in antitrust investigatons. Such an 
agreement already exists between the United States and West Germany. See Agreement 
Relatirtg to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 11, 1976, 
United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291. Self-
limitation, such as the limiting of requests for foreign evidence to reasonably relevant 
material rather than engaging in fishing expeditions, is another method of coping with 
the costs of discovery. See Shenefield, The Perspective of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER 
LAws 12, 21 (J. Griffin ed. 1979). 
1
•
1 See Velvel, supra note 15, at 5. 
,., 15 u.s.c. §§ 61-65 (1976). 
'°' See Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 35 (1974). 
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Another benefit from foreign governments' prosecution of 
claims in their own courts would be the easing of the burden on 
the American court system. American courts could concentrate 
their energies on cases which have an impact on the domestic 
economy rather than on those which concern injuries abroad. 184 
4. Determination of the existence of reciprocity-Reciprocity, 
in terms of antitrust law, is a complex issue. Many nations have 
adopted antitrust policies, 105 but the substantive elements vary 
from nation to nation. 108 This does not mean, however, that the 
same business practices condemned in the United States are 
condoned in England. The American laws may not be dupli-
cated, but "[t)here may be no real conflict at all ... [since] 
non-prohibition is not necessarily affirmative approval."107 A re~ 
sult-oriente,d approach would produce the most accurate evalua-
tion of the trade regulations of another nation. The American 
judge would decide as a matter of fact, based on the proof of-
fered by the foreign government, whether a certain business 
practice is prohibited or allowed by that nation at a given time. 
The court would therefore look beyond the existence of a particu-
lar statute to determine whether it is actually enforced. Anti-
trust laws which are shams would thus not qualify under the rec-
iprocity requirement. 
C. Exhaustion of Remedies 
The international antitrust objectives of the United States are 
not only to have countries enact antitrust measures but also to 
encourage the nations to use them effectively. A requirement 
that the foreign government exhaust all local remedies prior to 
'°' One author has stated: "At a time, however, when our courts are already burdened 
by substantial claims which have insignificant bearing on the effective administration of 
justice as to our own markets, there is wisdom in limiting antitrust jurisdiction to avoid a 
drain on our judicial resources occasioned by remote injuries." Rosenthal, supra note 46, 
at 219. 
••• See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra. 
••• One British commentator noted that 
The differences in substantive Jaw between the United States and the United 
Kingdom in antitrust ... are far too numerous to mention .... [O]ur legisla-
tion follows very different lines from the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Broadly, 
conduct, whether monopolistic or merely restrictive, is never wrong per se, but 
only after it has been found by an investigation, more administrative than judi-
cial, to be contrary to the public interest. 
Willoughby, Remarks by an English Solicitor, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 56, 59-60 (J. Griffin ed. 1979). See also 
Davidow, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing World, 8 LAw 
& PoL. lNT'L Bus. 895 (1976). 
,., See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 127 (1974). 
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bringing suit in the United States would further that goal. Such 
a requirement is not unknown in either international or Ameri-
can law. For example, it is used in the international context as a 
jurisdictional requirement of the International Court of Justice 
and the Permanent Court of International Justice.rns This re-
quirement "is both ancient and commonplace. It is so funda-
mental that it has almost become a cliche and it is difficult to 
find any real analysis of its meaning."109 A state must have at-
tempted all possibilities of obtaining a local remedy, whether or-
dinary or extraordinary, 110 substantive or procedural, or legal or 
administrative, before an international. procedure may be insti-
tuted to recover damages under international law." 1 
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 112 a 
government agency which invests in and insures private Ameri-
can enterprises which develop industry in less developed friendly 
nations, imposes similar requirements under American law."3 
Under the general terms of the Investment Insurance Agreement 
between the enterprise and OPIC, an American company may 
not collect its insurance money if the expropriatory action of the 
project country is a result of "failure on the part of the Investor 
or the Foreign Enterprise ( to the extent within the Investor's 
control) to make all reasonable measures, including proceeding 
under then available administrative and judicial procedures in 
'" T. HAESIER, THE EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN THE CASE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 17-19 (1968). 
lot 2 MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 312 (1956). 
11• The lnterhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), (1957] I.C.J. Rep. 6, demon-
strates how far a plaintiff must go to prove the exhaustion requirement. A Swiss com-
pany, Interhandel, had already appeared twice before the United States Supreme Court. 
At the end of the second proceeding, some of the issues were reopened for yet another 
trial. The issue before the I.C.J. was whether the Swiss company would have to await the 
outcome of this third appearance before the I.C.J. had jurisdiction to hear the interna-
tional claim brought on its behalf by the Swiss government. The I.C.J. decided that not-
withstanding the exhaustion of all remedies ordinarily available, there were still some 
extraordinary measures for which the company could apply. This rule imposes itself even 
more strongly when the internal procedures are in process, as was the case for 
lnterhandel. 
111 See T. HAESLER, supra note 108; The Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom). 
[1953] I.C.J. 10. 
11• Congress created OPIC by enacting the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-
2200a (1976), the purpose of which is to "mobilize and facilitate the participation of 
United States private capital and skills in the economic and social development of less 
developed friendly countries and areas, thereby complementing the development assis-
tance objectives of the United States .... " Id. at § 2191. 
113 An additional analogy is found in American labor law. A plaintiff-employee must 
allege and show exhaustion of the contractual grievance procedure before bringing a suit 
against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. See Vaca v. Sipes, 
386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-59 (1965). 
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the Project Country, to prevent or contest such action." 114 
Applied in the antitrust context, the exhaustion requirement 
would mandate that a foreign sovereign who has suffered injury 
first seek to redress the wrong in its own court system. The re-
quirement is, however, flexible. The foreign sovereign could be 
allowed to prove circumstances which would excuse it from the 
requirement. The foreign sovereign could plead futility on 
grounds that the antitrust violation is outside the jurisdiction of 
its courts. An alternative excuse would be unreasonable expense. 
Certain cases may arise where the cost of litigating the matter in 
local courts is substantially larger than bringing suit in the 
United States. 115 
In sum, restricting access to American courts by foreign sover-
eigns through use of the exhaustion of local remedies doctrine 
and the reciprocity requirement would throw the burden of en-
forcing antitrust law and protecting consumers upon the nation 
which is injured by the action. 116 Under the foregoing proposal, a 
foreign sovereign117 wishing to bring an antitrust suit in an Amer-
ican cour.t under the American antitrust laws would be limited 
to a single damage recovery. In order to sue, the foreign govern-
ment would have to meet two requirements. The nation would 
first have to prove that under a standard of general reciprocity 
its laws prohibit the same type of anticompetitive conduct al-
leged in the instant suit. The sovereign would then have to show 
'" "General Terms and Conditions," (234 KGT 12-70) art. 1.113(2), reprinted in H. 
STEINER AND D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 474 (2d ed. 1976). This require-
ment is in accordance with the definition of "expropriation" in 22 U.S.C. § 2198(b) 
(1976): 
The term "expropriation" includes, but is not limited to, any abrogation, repudi-
ation, or impairment by a foreign government of its own contract with an inves-
tor with respect to a project, where such abrogation, repudiation or impairment 
is not caused by the investor's own fault or misconduct, and materially adversely 
affects the continued operation of the project. 
"' An example of such a case is that where the evidence pertaining to the violation is 
located in the United States and the cost of foreign discovery is prohibitive. 
"' See Baker, supra note 103, at 35. The author states: "Government rarely works ef-
fectively unless it has an affirmative interest, and enforcement in this area is no 
exception." 
117 This proposal limits the restrictions to a foreign sovereign. To apply the same stan-
dards to government-owned entities as are applied to foreign governments would be ineq-
uitable. First, these corporations, like all other foreign corporations, do not have remedies 
apart from the treble damage suit. Second, these companies are not immune from suit 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because they engage in commercial activi-
ties. Finally, unless a special tax treaty exists, these corporations are subject to American 
tax law. While a government-owned corporation is often merely an arm of the sovereign, 
the court should be able to "pierce the veil" in such cases and deny treble damages to a 
corporation which is an extension of a foreign sovereign. See, e.g., Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
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either that it has exhausted all local remedies prior to bringing 
suit in the United States or that it should be excused from the 
requirement. 118 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS 
Legislators responded quickly to the Pfizer opinion but have 
failed to take into account all the issues raised therein. The pro~ 
posed legislation fails to meet the need to encourage foreign na-
tions to use their own courts to redress their antitrust grievances. 
Senator Strom Thurmond introduced a bill119 on January 19, 
1978, which would have amended section 4 of the Clayton Act to 
expressly exclude a foreign sovereign from the meaning of the 
word "person." Thus, a foreign government would not have been 
allowed the treble damage remedy. The bill did not, however, 
m A foreign sovereign may try to circumvent a statute of this type by using an Ameri• 
can forum but applying the law of the foreign government under an analysis .similar to 
the place-of-wrong analysis that is applied under conflict of laws principles i~ tort cases. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). An American court, if it 80 
chooses, may provide a forum for the foreign antitrust claim. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 19, Comment (b) (1965). International law 
does not, however, require a United States court to provide a forum. See id. at §2, Com-
ment (c). A forum court may refuse to give effect to foreign laws on many grounds, such 
as the fact that the law of the foreign sovereign is contrary to the public policy of the 
forum or that the forum court's judgments are not given effect by the foreign government 
involved. Id. at § 9, Comment (a). Thus, an American court could abstain from hearing 
an antitrust claim based on foreign law if it believes that the law is contrary to American 
policy or because it believes that there is little reason to expect a foreign court to enter-
tain an action based on a violation of American antitrust law. 
In light of the American policy of encouraging international antitrust activity, Ameri-
can courts should, perhaps, provide forums for the application of foreign antitrust law. If 
the court decides to hear the claim, it will determine, according to its own conflict of laws 
rules, whether a given question is one of substance or of procedure. If the question is one 
of substance the foreign law is applied, but the law of the forum governs all matters of 
procedure. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 122 and Comments a & b 
(1971). The question of whose law is to determine the measure of damages is more com-
plex. Considerable controversy exists as to whether the question of damages is substan-
tive or procedural. See generally J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAws: CASES AND MATERIALS 121-
22 (1978). A legislature arguably incorporates a specific remedy into a statute as a 
method of enforcing public policy. Thus, an antitrust remedy may be an important sub-
stantive provision. Therefore, a foreign sovereign could theoretically recover quadruple 
damages for a price-fixing violation should its laws so dictate. Many courts, however, 
have treated the issue of damages as procedural and applied the remedies of their forum. 
See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 21 (1962). 
Even if a court were to decide that the question of damages was substantive, it would 
be unlikely to award more than single damages because such a remedy would be contrary 
to American public policy. The United States Congress, if it enacted a statute limiting a 
foreign sovereign to single damages in an antitrust action, would act upon the clear pub-
lic policy of protecting American businesses. A court would probably be unwilling to defy 
such an explicit expression of legislative intent by allowing a foreign sovereign to collect 
damages through the back door which it would be denied under American law. 
111 S.2395, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
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leave a foreign government without redress; section 4(A) of the 
Clayton Act120 would have been amended to allow a foreign sov-
ereign single damages. Thus, while Senator Thurmond's bill ad-
dressed the issue of damages, it failed to provide any provision to 
encourage foreign nations to use their own courts. 
A second bill, 121 introduced by Senator Dennis DeConcini, in-· 
corporated the amendments proposed by Senator Thurmond's 
bill, and added an additional requirement of general reciprocity 
to the amended section 4(A). As a prerequisite to the suit, the 
Attorney General of the United States would be required to cer-
tify that (1) the United States could sue in its own name on a 
civil claim in the foreign nation's courts and (2) the foreign gov-
ernment has laws which prohibit anticompetitive practices. 122 
Both Senator Thurmond and Senator DeConcini addressed the 
anomalous situation created by Pfizer decision wherein a foreign 
sovereign would have a right in an American court which is de-
nied to the United States government. As Senator Thurmond re-
marked, "[i]t appears to me that it is only fair and that common 
sense would lead us to treat a foreign nation no better or no 
worse than we treat our own country in U.S. courts." 123 Senator 
DeConcini's bill had an advantage over Senator Thurmond's 
proposal in that its general reciprocity requirement encouraged 
nations to develop .their own antitrust laws. However, the bill's 
requirement that the Attorney General certify the existence of 
comparable antitrust laws ran counter to the general common 
law rule that proof of foreign law was a question of fact. 12' In 
addition, it placed an unwieldy burden on the Attorney Gen-
eral's office. Courts have developed a far greater expertise in 
dealing with proof of foreign law; judges are better able to decide 
in light of the facts of each case whether such anticompetitive 
practices would have been prohibited by the foreign sovereign's 
121 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976) reads: 
Whenever the United States is hereinafter injured in its business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefore in the 
United States district court for the district in which the defendant resides or is 
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall 
recover actual damages by it sustained and the cost of the suit. 
m S.2486, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Co-sponsors were Senators Thurmond and Al-
len, each of whom had introduced a bill of his own. Senator Allen's proposal, an amend-
ment (Amend. No. 1669, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)) to S.1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1977), was substantially equivalent to Senator Thurmond's proposal and thus will not be 
discussed here. 
112 S.2486, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b)(3) (1978). 
111 124 CONG. REc. S37 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978). 
124 See R. ScHLF.'IINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TExT AND MATERIALS 47-48 (3d ed. 
1970). 
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laws. 
Senator Daniel Inouye proposed another bill which would have 
allowed treble damage recovery provided there was strict reci-
procity between the two nations. 125 The bill amended section 4 of 
the Clayton Act by adding: "A foreign government, including 
any agency or agent thereof, may sue for any injury pursuant to 
this section if United-States persons and the United States gov-
ernment are permitted equivalent access and relief for the same 
injury in the courts of such foreign sovereign government. " 128 The 
standard of reciprocity demanded by Senator Inouye's bill was 
much stricter than that required by Senator DeConcini's bill. 
The former standard makes the right to sue "dependent on the 
existence of foreign laws formulated precisely like our own,"127 
leaving no freedom for foreign nations to fashion laws and reme-
dies to meet their own needs. Because no other nation has a 
treble damage remedy similar to ours128 or exactly the same legal 
system as ours, Senator Inouye's bill would have effectively 
banned all nations from American courts in antitrust cases. 
Congressman Charles Wiggins' amendment to an existing an-
titrust bill was perhaps the most drastic measure yet proposed, 
precluding all suits by foreign sovereigns without exception. 129 
The bill failed to distinguish between those nations which have 
no antitrust laws and those countries which have demonstrated a 
commitment to the same concepts on which American antitrust 
laws are based. Thus, no incentive was provided to foreign na-
tions to develop antitrust laws and the bill hindered progress tor-
wards an international antitrust structure. Congress did not act 
on any of the aforementioned proposals and only Senator DeCon-
cini's bill was reintroduced during the 96th Congress. 130 
Presently under consideration is the Antitrust Enforcement 
Act of 1979, 131 which contains an amendment by Senator Charles 
Mathias. This bill was originally designed to overturn Illinois 
Brick v. Illinois. 132 The amendment133 limits foreign sovereign 
izs S.2724, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
,.. Id. 
127 125 CONG. REC. S990 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1979). 
1
'" S. REP. No. 96-239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1979). 
in H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1978), deals with the Supreme Court decison 
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See note 132 infra. 
130 S.317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
131 S.300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). At this writing, the passage of this bill appears 
unlikely. Senate sources report "the bill has become a buzzword for complicated, bad 
legislation which will not help those consumers it is intending to." Road Looks Rough for 
Illinois Brick Bill, 65 A.B.A.J. 1783 (1979). 
132 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Supreme Court held that an 
indirect purchaser does not have standing to sue for treble damages under the antitrust 
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governments, departments, or agencies thereof, to single dam-
ages. The general reciprocity requirement is unusual in that it 
speaks only of violations which occur in the United States. The 
proposal is silent on the ability of a foreign sovereign to bring 
suit if, as in Pfizer, 134 the American enterprise's conduct occurs 
abroad. Furthermore, the bill offers little incentive for a foreign 
sovereign to exhaust its own remedies prior to bringing suit in 
the United States. 
The Congressional response to the Pfizer decison, though swift, 
has been inadequate. 135 The reciprocity requirements have for the 
most part been so strict as to bar any foreign nation from suit. 
The more liberal proposals fail to encourage nations to use their 
antitrust laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The consequences of the Pfizer decision remain unclear. The 
likelihood is great, however, that in a world of increasing interde-
pendence, the appearance of the government-trader seeking re-
dress for real or imagined harms will become more frequent. 
Congress should take this opportunity to enact legislation that 
will promote the economic and political interests of the United 
States and still give foreign nations access, if somewhat limited, 
to American courts. The United States has neither the respon-
sibility nor the need to protect or regulate the internal markets of 
laws. While Pfizer and Illinois Brick both deal with the issue of consumer access to anti-
trust remedies, the decisions have little practical impact on each other. A foreign sover-
eign generally purchases directly from American producers and is thus unlikely to be 
barred from suit by Illinois Brick. 
133 The provision reads: 
[S]uits under ... [Seeton 4 of the Clayton Act] brought by foreign sovereign 
governments, departments, or agencies thereof, shall be limited to actual dam-
ages: And . . . no foreign sovereign may maintain an action in any Court of the 
United States under the authority of this section unless its laws would have for-
bidden the type or category of conduct on which the action is based if that con-
duct had occurred within its territory at the time it occurred in the United 
States, and unless its laws allow the government of the United States to recover 
damages caused by such conduct through the judicial or administrative processes 
of the foreign state. 
S.300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1979) (as amended). The Federal Republic of Germany 
has already expressed its fear that the Mathias Amendment would "be construed as a de 
facto bar to the German Government or its corporations from suing antitrust cases in 
U.S. courts." S. REP. No. 96-239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1979) (note from Federal 
Republic.of Germany to Department of State, presented by Douglas Bennet, Ass't Secre-
tary for Congressional Relations). 
13' See text accompanying note 92 supra. 
135 A major problem with all of the proposed legislation is the failure to adequately 
define "sovereign." The definitions raise questions as to the status of transnational orga-
nizations and protectorates under the law. 
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other nations. By taking the · measures outlined above, the 
United States can move another step along the road toward an 
international antitrust program and freer world markets. 
-Marianne P. Gaertner 

